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I. INTRODUCTION
Regulating sovereign debt worldwide has improved
substantially in the thirty years since Mexico sparked a crisis that
would span across Central and South America. Much of this success
can be attributed to the mutual cooperation between creditors,
sovereign debtors, multinational institutions, and grassroots efforts.
In some instances, however, a single holdout creditor can indefinitely
delay a sovereign's entire economic reformation effort, thereby
undermining legitimate attempts to bring about financial, political,
and social stability. In the advent of a secondary market for sovereign
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debt, these holdout creditors - known as vulture funds ("VFs") - are
responsible for taking opportunistic measures in an effort to make an
enormous profit from distressed debt.
VFs are particularly polarizing due to their unscrupulous
business behavior when making choice investments. Many courts in
the United States and United Kingdom have nevertheless failed to
correlate this behavior with illegal conduct, and have in fact rendered
substantial judgments favoring VFs participation as voluntary
creditors. Others argue that VFs are an integral component in the
remaining debt reorganization markets of Latin America, Africa, or
other areas afflicted by third-world conditions. Proponents suggest
that VFs are necessary to prevent opportunistic defaults, as well as to
uncover devious corrupt practices within these governments.' As a
result of the complex issues raised in these cases, as well as the
history contributing to a secondary market for securitized debt,
recent legislation has been drafted in both the U.S. and Europe in
order to curb potential recoveries by VFs against impoverished
nations.
Such legislation purports to provide its remedies by curbing
the latitude that VFs are afforded. Although the legislation may seem
to "re-write" the contract - generally disfavored as a matter of
contract law - this is a reasonable remedy considering that courts
lack the financial expertise to render proper judgments, especially
considering the broad effect that these decisions have on international markets. This Note argues that the Stop VULTURE Funds
Act in the U.S. should be adopted, in light of the failure of courts to
adhere to U.S. policy regarding international debt management, and
to prevent further damage to international financial markets. Part II
of this Note outlines the background of sovereign loan markets,
paying special attention to the Latin American debt crisis of the early
1980s. This debt crisis prompted many of the VF cases in their present
* Ryan E. Avery is a litigation associate at Foreman Friedman, PA, in Miami,
Florida. Thank you to my family and colleagues for supporting me in this endeavor
and special credit goes to my colleague Aaron L. Warren, University of Miami

School of Law, Class of 2011, for drafting.
1 See generally Elizabeth Broomfield, Note, Subduing the Vultures: Assessing
Government Caps on Recovery in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 473, 508 (2010).
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form. Previous VF cases have established the groundwork leading to
the current legislation. Part III identifies the current legislation in
effect in Europe, specifically in Belgium and the U.K., which are
examples of two large VF litigation forums. This section also
examines the proposed U.S. legislation, the Stop VULTURE Funds
Act, which is particularly meaningful in light of the VF cases heard in
U.S. courts. Part IV argues the various justifications supporting U.S.
legislation, such as preventing the further erosion of sovereign
immunity and to keep judges and juries from making financial
decisions where they arguably lack proper expertise. This Note then
closes with examples of how judicial opinions in the U.S. have
confused the legislative intent specifically enacted to protect
sovereigns through the restructuring process and suggests a better
interpretation.
II.BACKGROUND

VF litigation raises a mix of challenging issues affecting the
rights of creditors and sovereigns alike, and the issues generally
include legal, political, humanitarian, public policy, foreign policy,
and economic dimensions. 2 It should go without saying that the
proposed U.S. legislation, and the active European legislation,
embodies these same concepts. Thus, in order to evaluate the broad
issues as they arise, it is necessary to understand the major developments that have shaped the sovereign loan markets, particularly in
the latter half of the 20th century.
Part A will proceed by discussing a brief timeline of events
affecting sovereign lending, culminating with the infamous Latin
American debt crisis of the early 1980s. Next, Part B identifies the
effects of this crisis on commercial lenders as well as sovereign
governments, evaluating the failed restructuring efforts implemented
for the remainder of the 1980s. Part C will begin by discussing the
Brady Plan introduced in 1989, emphasizing its swift success as a
restructuring mechanism. This will be followed by a discussion of the
rise in a secondary market for securitized debt as a means for
reducing regional debt. Finally, Part D will conclude by describing
2 See Philip J. Power, Note, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and

Its Implicationsfor Future Restructurings,64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2701, 2704 (1996).
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the evolution of VFs and their participation in the secondary debt
market, while also examining the modern status of VF litigation.
A. The Modern Origins of Sovereign Debt in Latin America
Until the early 1970s, less-developed countries ("LDCs")
worldwide received the bulk of funding under the multinational
arrangement as it was designed under the auspices of the Bretton
Woods System ("Bretton Woods"). 3 Under Bretton Woods, an LDC
could receive loans through three distinct channels: (1) short term
funding provided by the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), (2)
national infrastructure loans issued by the World Bank, or (3) special
4
project loans provided by Western, industrialized governments.
Much of the funding occurred through the IMF channel, but the
system enforced structural limitations on borrowing. 5 For example,
loans were directly capped by a sovereign's annual contribution to
the IMF, or they were indirectly limited by enforcing compliance
with strict austerity guidelines. 6 These policies underscored the belief
that developing economies were unstable, thus requiring greater
oversight especially during turbulent economic times.
Until the late 1960s, the broad policies under Bretton Woods
strengthened the IMF's pedagogy by curtailing overvalued currencies and payment deficits and implementing a fixed rate of
exchange. 7 Beginning in the early 1970s, however, the IMF lost
considerable control over the distressed loan market as a growing
rate of inflation reduced the agency's ability to issue loans compared
to previous years. 8 While the IMF was losing its share of market
demand, private institutions such as banks and investment houses
were gaining strength. In particular, banks located in Western
economies utilized their "petrodollar" wealth, which had been
generated during the 1970s, to invest in LDC loans throughout Latin
Theodore Allegaert, Recalcitrant Creditors Against Debtor ATations, or How to
Play Darts, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 429, 433 (1997).
3

41d.

' See Jessica W. Miller, Comment, Solving the Latin American Sovereign Debt
Crisis,
22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 677, 678-79 (2001).
61id.
7 Allegaert,

supra note 3.
8Id; see also Miller, supra note 5, at 679.
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America. 9 Funding was fueled by the creditor's confident perception
that Latin America was a credit-worthy risk, 10 and LDCs increasingly
sought larger amounts of capital to sustain the region's "ideology of
growth."" The IMF's position was then degraded further as
commercial banks began to issue loans unconditionally - a strategy in
direct competition with the IMF's policy of austerity, and by 1980 a
whopping 70 percent of external debt originated from private
12
banks.
As Bretton Woods eroded as a system of financial regulation,
banks and governments were suddenly enabled to engage in particu13
larly risky behavior during the investment boom in Latin America.
Commercial banks significantly neglected general creditor controls,
such as analyzing profit margins on sovereign projects or limiting the
scope of sovereigns' investment on their loans. 14 This behavior was a
stark deviation from the practices of the IMF, and as a result LDCs
frequently invested in inefficient state-owned industries that lacked
the necessary revenue capability for servicing the loans. 15 To make
matters worse, banks were eager to extend their loans, fortuitously
believing sovereigns were immune from bankruptcy risks and
servicing defaults. 16 The IMF's diminished role as a universal
watchdog exacerbated these risks, resulting in a region marked by
overvalued currency and delinquent payments across many
17
nations.
By August 1982, the debt crisis in Latin America publicly
surfaced when Mexico became the first sovereign to announce its
inability to make future payments on the country's billion dollars of
9Miller, supra note 5, at 679-80.
10Id.

11Allegaert, supra note 3, at 434 (suggesting that Latin LDCs were conversely
impacted by the oil shocks which had provided significant capital for banks in the
Western world).
12 Miller, supra note 5, at
680.
See Alberto Gonzalo Santos, Note, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt
Reduction for Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 72-74
(1991).
14
1d at 73-74.
"5See id. at 74.
id
17See Allegaert, supra note 3, at 434.

16
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debt. 18 Mexico's disclosure rippled throughout the Americas and
even the world. Within the following year, fifteen additional countries abandoned their debt obligations totaling approximately $90
million in debt;19 among the other Latin sovereigns were Brazil,
Venezuela, Argentina, and Bolivia. 20 Economist have estimated that
external debt ballooned roughly sevenfold in Latin America from
1973 to 1983, escalating from approximately $48 billion in 1973 to
nearly $350 billion by 1983.21
B. The Dynamics of the Immediate Response to the Sovereign Debt
Crisis
Creditor banks were among the first entities to devise a
response to the crisis, although motivated largely by a desire to
protect their own assets and holdings. 22 At the outset, these creditors
were faced with severe monetary ramifications, including bankruptcy, as the crisis had illuminated the grim reality that bank loans
far exceeded their capital reserve requirements. 23 Moreover, a default
of this magnitude meant that creditors were forced to declare each
original loan as a "nonperforming" asset, a situation that would
24
result in immediate lost profits on quarterly earning statements.
With massive principals due on these loans and very little reserve
capital to cover losses, financial institutions faced an inevitable,
potentially system-wide collapse.
In devising a response, the banks recognized the fact that
sovereigns could entirely avoid default if they were at least capable
18

Miller, supra note 5, at 680; see also James M. Hays i1,
Note, The Sovereign Debt

BROOK. L. REv. 905, 913-14 (2010); Power, supra note 2, at 2708;
Nora Claudia Lustig, Mexico in Crisis, the U.S. to the Rescue. The Financial
Assistance Packages of 1982 and 1995, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Jan. 1997,
availableat http://www.brookings.edu/ articles/ 19970 1development lustig.aspx.
19 Hays, supra note 18.
20 Miller, supra note 5, at 680; see also Gonzalo, supra note 13, at 71-75.
21 Miller, supra note 5, at 680; see also Gonzalo, supra note 13, at 71-75.
22See Miller, supra note 5, at 681; see also Gonzalo, supra note 13, at 71-75; Hays,
supra note 18, at 914.
23 See Miller, supra note 5, at 682; see also Gonzalo, supra note 13, at 71-75; Hays,

Dilemma, 75

supra note 18, at 914.
24 Miller, supra note 5, at 681; see also Alan Riding, N.Y. Times, March 11, 1984,
availableat 1984 WLNR 505425; Power, supra note 2, at 2710-11.
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of paying their still-massive interest within a 90-day window. 25
Utilizing this information, creditors proposed a scheme that prevented sovereigns from defaulting and enabled banks to declare their
loans a performing asset. Known as "bridge loans," the lending
banks that provided the excessive loans initially responded to the
crisis by awarding new, secondary loans for the singular purpose to
pay interest that was due on the note. Remarkably, this measure
succeeded during the interim - original loans were still recognized as
performing assets for the lenders, and this kept both sovereigns and
creditors afloat long enough to develop a structural adjustment for
26
debt recovery.
During the next stage, creditors engaged with Latin American
finance officials in order to implement restructure and repayment
schedules. 27 Restructuring usually "wrote-off" a substantial portion
of outstanding debt, reconfigured contract terms and payment
deadlines, and otherwise allowed both parties to completely rene28
gotiate the contract on terms amenable to the distressed borrower.
In addition, restructuring promoted voluntary cooperation among
joint parties, and avoided unnecessary court intervention that had the
undesirable effect of obtaining judgments against the very sovereigns
that were unable to service the original debt.29 Finally, the ideal
restructuring provided incentives on both sides: the borrower evaded
the burden of excessive debt and economic chaos, while the lender
was guaranteed a structural repayment program for a portion of the
debt. 30 Indeed, restructuring efforts throughout the late 1980s
reflected general cooperation among banks and sovereigns, resulting
in over forty successful restructurings between 1982 and 1984.31
Nevertheless, restructuring ultimately failed as a comprehensive solution due in large part to the emergence of the holdout
25
26

Miller,
supra note 5, at 681-82; see also Power, supra note 2, at 2710.
See Miller,
supra note 5, at 681-82; Power, supra note 2, at 2710-11; see also

Hays, supra note 20, at 914.
27 See generally Allegaert, supra note 3, at 436-37; Miller, supra note 5, at
682-84;
Hays, supra note 18, at 914-15.
28Agasha Mugasha, Sohttionsfor Developing-Country External Debt: Insolvency or
Forgiveness?, 13 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 859, 866 (2007).
29 See id. at 867.
30 See id. at 866.
31 Hays, supra note 18, at 915.
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problem. 32 Since restructuring depends on full cooperation between
all other parties and joint parties alike, small rogue creditors
routinely posed a challenging threat to a successful restructuring
agreement.33 For example, smaller banks - which hold a smaller
portion of the outstanding sovereign's debt - might reasonably
believe that a court-ordered default was the least-burdensome choice
with respect to the debt they owned. Since a creditor could only
restructure their portion of the debt voluntarily, the small bank could
enforce a court proceeding against the sovereign at any time
following an event of default. Large banks, by contrast, would rarely
consider a court-ordered default, because larger banks controlled a
larger portion of the debt, which made it less likely to have their
judgment satisfied. Simply put, sovereigns could satisfy a smaller
judgment easier than they could a larger judgment. Therefore, larger
banks were more likely to endorse restructuring agreements, yet
34
these sentiments were routinely disrupted by recalcitrant creditors.
In addition to the private efforts to restructure sovereign
debt, the multinational IMF also offered additional, though limited,
financial assistance. 35 Prior to receiving an IMF loan, however, the
recipient sovereign was required to adhere to strict economic
austerity guidelines calling for a pre-defined "structural adjustment
program." 36 After a long struggle, though, these standards ultimately
proved too abrasive for the unstable Latin LDCs. Combined with
recalcitrance from the private lending sector, the debt crisis stagnated
and LDCs reencountered similar challenges such as those in the early
1980s. Most LDCs fell back into high levels of unemployment and
widespread poverty, while other nations became forums of social
37
discontent through violent protests and political coups.

32 Id;

see also Miller, supra note 5, at 682-83.
supra note 18, at 915; see also Miller, supra note 5, at 682-83.
34 See Miller, supra note 5, at 683.
33See Hays,

35 id.
36 Id

at 684-85.

Id. at 685 (hundreds of people died during Venezuelan protest against severity of
austerity programs imposed by government on behalf of creditors); see also Jonathan
Fuerbringer, Brazil and Banks Reach Agreement on Reducing Debt, N.Y. Times,
July 10, 1992, at Al (describing a thwarted coup in Venezuela and accusations of
corruption in Brazil).
37
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C. The Brady Plan and the Evolution of a Secondary Debt Market
Following multiple failed attempts to restructure burgeoning
regional debt, the Brady Plan was introduced by United States
Secretary of the Treasury, Nicholas Brady, in 1989.38 The Brady Plan,
like the restructuring efforts before, encouraged voluntary participation of bank creditors, "to reduce the debt obligations ... by restructuring old debt and providing new loans." 39 Conversely, sovereigns
were required to reduce inflation, open economies to foreign
investment and follow the IMF's guidelines for austerity. 40 The
financing model was facilitated by converting old loans owed by
sovereign debtors into newly minted "Brady Bonds," and Brady
Bonds were offered for sale to the general public as securitized U.S.backed Treasury Bonds. 41 The money generated from Brady Bonds
was used to pay back the sovereign's debt obligations, although the
42
value of the debt was typically reduced well below its actual value.
Through the issuance of Brady Bonds, a "secondary sovereign debt market" was effectively created for the investment of
43
LDC debt, particularly in the emerging markets of Latin America.
The securitization of sovereign debt created this ancillary financial
market for trading and buying Brady Bonds, harmonizing greater
flexibility and diversity of the sovereign debt with adequate loan
forgiveness for the sovereign borrowers. The Brady Plan also
increased the number of market participants holding debt, therefore
providing more resources for repayment, and further opportunity to
44
successfully restructure.
By 1992 the status quo had improved markedly, as several
Latin LDCs, including those hardest hit, enjoyed remarkable success
in reducing sovereign debt and restoring confidence in financial

38 Miller, supra note 5, at 685.
39 Elliot Associates, L.P. v. The Republic of Panama, 975 F. Supp. 332, 334

(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
40 See Fuerbringer, supra note 37.
41Miller, supra note 5, at 685-86.
42 See Id at 686.
43 Id.; see also Hays, supra note 18, at 915-17 ; Mugasha, supra note
28, at 868.
44 See Hays, supra note 18, at 915-16.
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markets.45 Former Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker
stated, "the Latin American debt crisis is no longer a crisis," citing
renewed growth patterns and debt manageability. 46 At a time when
many feared that Latin America would never recover from their debt
crisis, the Brady Plan and a new securitized debt market made a bold
statement that debt relief was indeed achievable.
D. The Development of Vulture Funds and Subsequent Litigation
Despite the broad success of the Brady Plan, some countries
were nevertheless derailed during their Brady restructuring due to
the emergence of so-called "vulture funds" ("VFs"). 47 In the context
of sovereign debt, VFs are defined as investment companies seeking
profits by purchasing distressed (or "decaying") debt in secondary
sovereign markets at substantial discount.48 Rather than participate
with other creditors per the Brady Plan, the VFs holdout during
negotiations and may allege immunity from regulatory penalties or
assert their valid right to refuse consent. 49 In recent years, VFs have
become notorious for being litigious against not only distressed
nations, but also against some of the poorest and most unstable
50
economies in the world.
VFs typically operate by strategically purchasing distressed
debt after a sovereign has committed a technical default, and often
wait for a period of months to determine whether the market will rise
or fall in relation to the value of the debt. An improving market
works to the benefit of VFs in two-ways: on one hand, the VF is now
holding a profitable investment compared to the debt they originally
purchased; on the other hand, VFs have a stronger negotiating
See Fuerbringer, supra note 37 (Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and
Brazil are among the nations that attribute their success to the use of Brady Bonds).
45

46

id.

See Broomfield, supra note 1, at 484-86; see also Hays, supra note 18, at 918-19.
Broomfield, supra note 1, at 485-86.
See Hays, supra note 18, at 918-19.
50 See Lydia Polgreen, Unlikely Ally Against Congo Republic Graft,
N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/world/africa/
1Ocongo.html? r-1&pagewanted-all ("Such investors, running what critics
derisively call vulture funds, have been widely denounced by the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund for forcing poor countries to fend off costly
lawsuits rather than build classrooms and clinics.").
47
48
49

2011

LEGISLATION ON PREDATORY DEBT INVESTING

277

position and are more affective at holding out against the sovereign's
restructuring. 51 By riding on the coattails of legitimate commercial
banks eager to forge a Brady Plan, VFs can potentially earn enormous
profits on their investment. 52 In recent studies, the U.S. heard eleven
cases against African LDCs as well as Nicaragua, demanding $695
million on primary debt, and collecting judgments that totaled $659.4
53
million.
The judicial opinions supporting VF rights reflect the notion
that U.S. courts will hold sovereigns accountable irrespective of their
intention to sincerely adopt legitimate recovery measures. 54 However, these opinions assert contradictory positions in the context of
authoritative bodies purporting to establish economic principles for
international debt relief - examples include the IMF, the World Bank,
and even commensurate U.S. legislation establishing a guide to
international debt recovery. 55 Although the 1980s Latin American
debt crises has been declared dead, there are recent examples
" See generally Power, supra note 2, at 2752-53 (citations omitted).
52 See e.g., Michael Cooper and Leslie Wayne, Publicity-Shy Giuliani Backer Is
Thrust Into Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
23099010 ("Mr. Singer [VF owner] is perhaps best known for the fight he put up -

and the money he made in his battle over Peruvian debt. In 1996, he paid $11.4
million for $20 million worth of discounted, government-backed Peruvian bank debt.
Then, rather than joining with 180 other Peruvian creditors who agreed to a plan
using bonds to forgive some of the impoverished country's debt, Mr. Singer held out
for bigger payments .... He battled in the courts. At one point he hired an Albany
lobbying firm and got New York State to change an obscure law to strengthen his
position. When the dust had settled, Mr. Singer ended up getting $58 million for his
Peruvian investment.")
53 Broomfield, supra note 1, at 507.
54 See, e.g,. Elliott Associates v. The Republic of Panama, 975 F. Supp. 332
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a VF could enforce its default claims against Panama,

who had taken "advantage of the Brady Plan and restructured much of its external
debt" by the time the lawsuit was instituted).
55 See, e.g., Polgreen, supra note 50, at Al (reporting that "vulture funds, have been
widely denounced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for
forcing poor countries to fend off costly lawsuits rather than build classrooms and
clinics"); 22 U.S.C. § 5322(1) & (8) (2006) (Congressional "findings" asserting that
the international debt problem threatens the safety and soundness of the international
financial system, threatens the stability of international trading, and that new debt
approaches should focus on a reduction in current debt service obligations by debtor

nations).
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suggesting that VFs continue to enjoy success, reaping benefits
against poor nations defaulting on their debt. 56 Thus, VF legislation
provides ample room for lively debate; in light of legal ramifications
and foreign policy concerns, international economic policies would
clearly benefit by such legislation.

E.Heavily Indebted Poor Country ("HIPC") Initiative
Anne Krueger, as First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF,
commented recently, if "a country's debts become truly unsustainable, it is in everyone's interest that the problem is addressed
promptly and in an orderly way." 57 These sentiments would appear
to ring true for even the most heavily indebted nations throughout
the world and have surely led to the on-going support for the HIPC.
The HIPC is an initiative that was created in 2006 by the International
58
Development Association (IDA), a subdivision of the World Bank.
The program seeks to annually identify the world's poorest
economies, in an effort to design sustainable and responsible fiscal
policies to rid them of debt. 59
In late 2010, the report isolated 40 countries worldwide,
primarily throughout Africa and Latin America, as consisting of the
most heavily indebted nations in the world. 60 Among these extremely
poor nations, the report identified 17 ongoing cases by rogue
61
creditors seeking monetary judgment against their distressed debt.
See, e.g.,

Vulture Fund Awarded $100m in Jersey Court, JUBILEEDEBT
CAMPAIGN.ORG (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk/Vulture
%20Fund%20awarded%205 100m%20in%20Jersey%20court+6486.twl
(reporting
that a court in Jersey made a $100 million judgment in favor of a U.S. VF against the
Democratic Republic of Congo).
57 Anne Krueger, Should Countries Like Argentina Be Able to Declare
Themselves
Bankrupt?, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Jan. 18, 2002, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2002/ 011802.htm.
58 See Broomfield, supra note 1,
at 490-91.
59Id. at 491.
56

60

See

INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT

ASSOCIATION

AND

INTERNATIONAL

(HIPC)
(MDRI) STATUS OF
IMPLEMENTATION, at 7 (2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/
2010/09141 0.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2010) [hereinafter HIPC Initiative].
61 Id.at 20.
MONETARY

FUND,

HEAVILY

INDEBTED

INITIATIVE AND MULTILATERAL

POOR

COUNTRIES

DEBT RELIEF INITIATIVE

INITIATIVE
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It should be noted, however, that this figure clearly does not include
vulture litigation targeted against other very poor nations, as the
HIPC only focuses on those nations in the very bottom echelon of
third-world countries. Thus, in sovereigns ravaged by civil war,
political upheaval, and social chaos, VFs nonetheless enjoy court
protection in seeking to gain a monetary judgment against both their
interest and the interest of others through international markets.
III. LEGISLATION
A. Europe
In 2008, Belgium became the first country to pass national
legislation targeting VFs in an effort to protect debt restructuring
efforts held hostage by VFs. 62 This occurred in reaction to several VFs
increasing litigation activity within Belgium, beginning around
2007.63 In addition, Belgium legislatures have passed a broader, nonbinding agreement purporting to call on the World Bank and IMF to
implement multinational programs to aid in prohibiting creditor
litigation. 64 Such measures would most likely mimic the recently
proposed Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRM"),
which was first introduced by Anne Krueger of the IMF in 2002 but
has since failed to gain international traction. 65 Although the SDRM is
a broad policy well beyond the scope of this paper, it should be
briefly noted that prominent academics have attributed criticism for
the SDRM to the "steadfast opposition . . . by the major financial
industry associations."66
On April 8, 2010, the United Kingdom passed similar
legislation to Belgium laws, entitled the Developing Country Debt

62

Broomfield, supra note 1, at 503-4.

63 Id. at
64 See

65

503.

Id. at 504.

See Anne Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring,

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,

April 16, 2002, available at http://www.imf.org/

external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/index.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
66 Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36
Geo. J. Int'l L. 299, 391-92 (2005) (also citing, e.g., the absence of progress in
incremental contractual approaches within the SDRM framework, and the distinction
between U.S. policies and European policies in attempting to curb sovereign debt)
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Bill ("Recovery Bill"). 67 This legislation is effective for one year, at
which time Parliament will vote on whether to extend the law, and if
so, whether to modify any of its terms. 68 The "Recovery Bill" is
notable for its emphasis protecting HIPC countries against creditor
litigation, which the UK has identified as particularly vulnerable to
the damages by VFs. 69 The legislation comes in the aftermath of at
70
least seven recent HIPC cases heard in the U.K. jurisdiction.
B. United States
Legislation in the U.S. has lagged well behind that of Europe;
a statistic that is unsurprising considering that European countries,
unlike the U.S., are now resolving their financial issues through
quick, nonpartisan, and broad reform measures and treaty obligations. 71 This delay coupled with the fact that governments in middleincome and poor countries owned more than $300 billion in
outstanding bonds governed by either New York or English law. 72
Consequently, U.S. Representative Maxine Waters (D-California)
introduced the "Stop Vulture Funds Act" ("Vulture Act") on August
1, 2008, which sought to enforce government caps on VF-obtained
judgments. 73 Under this bill, VF funds have limited recovery in U.S.
courts; the limitation being based on the purchase price on their debt
plus 6% accrued interest. 74 Interestingly, sovereigns lose protection
from the Vulture Act if they "commit gross violations of human
rights, engage in excessive military spending, support terrorism, or
fail to cooperate with the United States on narcotics control

Broomfield, supra note 1, at 477.
See Id.
69 Id. at 506.
70 Id. at 504.
71Hagan, supra note 66, at 391.
72 Anna Gelperin, Innovation After the Revolution: Foreign Sovereign Bond
Contracts Since 2003, Rut. S. Law (forthcoming) at 3, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract -1272464.
73Press Release, Congresswoman Waters Introduces Bill to Protect Poor Countries
from Vulture Funds [hereinafter Press Release], http://www.house.gov/apps/list/
press/ca35 waters/ PR080801 vulturefunds.html, (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
67
68

74Broomfield,

supra note 1, at 507.
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matters." 75 Passing the Vulture Act bill is currently discussion in the
76
U.S. Congress.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Benefits of VFs Compared to Modern Framework
Although VFs pose a grave risk to the stability and restructuring of sovereign nations, there are several reasons justifying the
benefits of VFs. First and foremost, proponents liken the value of VFs
to their ability to expose corruption within the poorly indebted
sovereign. 77 Indeed, one example attributes VFs with successfully
uncovering $82,000 in fraud, perpetrated by the Congolese government.78 Moreover, supporters argue that VFs help ensure that
sovereigns are prevented from engaging in opportunistic defaults or
coercive restructuring offers. 79 In this way, VFs have been most
effective at deterring recalcitrant sovereign behavior, while concepts
such as "reputational harm" have simply failed at a theoretical
level. 80
In light of these arguments, it appears that multinational
agencies have increasingly moved in a direction that will negate these
one-time institutional failures. As noted in Part III.A above,
organizations spearheaded by the World Bank, IMF, and IDA, have
implemented procedures designed to increase transparency of the
actions of heavily indebted nations. Other agencies, including grassroots movements, call for an end to the debt crises and unscrupulous
VFs through various mediums that create heightened public
awareness and bring VFs to the international spotlight. 81 Due to these
programs, corruption is more likely to be identified during the stages
75Press
76See

Release, supra note 73.
Broomfield, supra note 1, at 507.

77See id.
78 Cooper

& Wayne, supra note 52; see also Broomfield, supra note 1, at 516-17

(noting that the Elliott fund, in the course of its attempt to seize Congolese assets,
uncovered corruption in the Congo that otherwise would have continued
unreported).
79See Broomfield, supra note 1, at 514-15.
80

See id.at 515.
See, e.g., JUBILEE DEBT CAMPAIGN, http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk!
Our%20mission+2245.twl (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
81
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of restructuring, with or without the participation from vulture
funds.
In addition, the proposed U.S. Vulture Act would prevent
corrupt sovereigns from ever enjoying the benefits under the new
legislation.82 Of course, this would come at a small cost - prior to
litigation, lawyers would need to establish whether the sovereign
involved in litigation was linked to the enumerated behavior under
the statute. In this way, though, the Vulture Act attempts to weed out
any illegitimate nations who would unfairly benefit under the
proposed protection, thus negating the supposed "value" of VFs.
Considering the significant success that creditors have enjoyed in
U.S. courts, many legitimate countries would experience drastic
benefits under this new bill, including their ability to restructure
debt, build new schools, construct new roads, or otherwise begin the
process of rebuilding their economies. 83 The benefits should be
weighed heavily against the small costs attributed to isolating the
potentially opportunistic sovereign cases.
B. Reducing U.S. Localization of VF Cases
Due to the fact that legislation has already passed in the U.K.,
it is imperative for U.S. courts to at least make a salutary attempt to
reflect commensurate change. As it currently stands, VFs are
prohibited from litigating HIPCs in U.K. courts, a jurisdiction which
has been distinguished as one of the most common forums for
litigation.84 In addition, VFs are specifically prohibited from litigating
in Belgium, a nation that saw increasing creditor court activity
leading up to the passage of its current legislation. Thus, the U.S. is
now the most creditor friendly forum for HIPC cases - perhaps VFs
altogether - and this may lead to many undesirable consequences for
U.S. courts and foreign policy.
Among the leading consequences is a possible adverse effect
to the judicial economy because a vastly increasing number of VF
cases would seek U.S. jurisdiction. When litigated in U.S. courts, VF
82 See Press Release, supra note 73.

83See, e.g., Polgreen, supra note 50, at Al.
84 See Broomfield, supra note 1, at 485-86 (stating that jurisdictions in New York,
Paris, and London are most common for VF lawsuits).
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cases are remarkably successful; obtaining judgments totaling almost
95% of claimed damages in recent HIPC cases. 85 The anticipated
increase in U.S.-based litigation would lead to further delays in debt
restructuring, debt repayment, and HIPC reorganization. As the
86
HIPC itself has noted a drop in accessible funds to fight litigation, it
is imperative for leading economic nations to initiate domestic
measures, such as the Vulture Act, which is designed to prevent
detrimental HIPC litigation.
C. A Need to End Further Erosion of Sovereign Immunity
VF litigation has resulted in particular erosion from the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, and continued litigation without
government caps poses a substantial risk to further erode this
doctrine when it is not desirable. Generally speaking, a sovereign
state is immune from the courts in a foreign jurisdiction in relation to
an act of sovereign authority. 87 Normally, this would have prevented
many of the VF cases from being heard in U.S. courts, since these
cases tend to arise against the interest of sovereign debt holders.
Nevertheless, governing law in foreign jurisdictions can limit the
scope of this protection, such as the Federal Sovereign Immunities
Act ("FSIA"),88 which provides for the governing law, and explicitly
provides for exceptions to the immunity privilege in U.S. courts.
Notably, these exceptions are relevant to sovereign debt litigation to
the extent that U.S. courts can exercise jurisdiction over sovereigns in
the context of a "commercial activity." 89 In a series of recent federal
cases, the courts have attempted to define this elusive concept,
though in doing so they have gradually chipped away many
immunity rights traditionally afforded to foreign nations.

85

See id at 507 (creditors claimed $695 million on HIPC debt, with original face-

value of $195.9 million, obtaining favorable judgments that amounted to $659.4
million).
86 See HIPC Initiative, supra note 60, at 21.
87 See Caroline Bradley, The International Financial
System: Sovereigns, at 48,
available
at
http://beta.blenderlaw.umlaw.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/0 1
infinmats201 0.chap2.pdf (working paper).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2008) [hereinafter "§1605"].
89 See § 1605(a)(2).
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Most prominently, the Supreme Court has held that
commercial activity exists where a sovereign has participated in a
bond market for the sole purpose of refinancing their national debt. 90
Thus, in Weltover, the majority for the Court determined that Argentina did not have immunity and therefore performed a commercial
activity (under the meaning of the FSIA §1605(a)(2)), where the
sovereign's conduct concerned the issuance of debt instruments for
the private market. 91 The opinion focused on the "nature" of the
activity as opposed to its "purpose," and then determined, "that it is
irrelevant why Argentina participated in the bond market in the
manner of a private actor; it matters only that it did so."92 In rejecting
Argentina's contention that their activity was precluded since it did
not involve "raising capital or financing acquisitions," the Court
observed that private parties often participate in these markets and
93
issue bonds with the intent for "refinancing debt."
The Court's opinions also addressed the ambiguity of De
Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua,94 where the Fifth Circuit held
that Nicaragua's "purpose" was indeed necessary in determining
whether the failure of the national bank to honor a check was
sufficiently commercial. 95 Perhaps Weltover is most distinguishable,
however, because there was never a genuine dispute whether
Argentina engaged in purely market activity - in contrast, De Sanchez
concerned a noticeable degree of ambiguity, thus requiring further
evaluation by the court. Nevertheless, the ambiguity begs the
question of where the Court will draw the line, especially considering
the rise in secondary bond trades which have diversified the number
of sovereign bond holders who may subject those sovereigns to U.S.
jurisdiction.
Two earlier cases have also illustrated the courts' reluctance
to grant immunity, in both the context of waivers and comity.
Although these cases arose in general creditor suits, they are nonetheless reflective of the general trend adopted by VF cases such as
90See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607 (2002).
9' See id
92 Id. at 614-16 (emphasis added).
9' Id. at 616.
94 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985).
95 See 504 U.S. at 616-17.
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I/\eltover. In Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 96
Banco Nacional passed a resolution prohibiting payments from state
owned entities to foreign creditors. 97 Libra Bank, however, sought
payment on a $40 million loan, then initiated a default proceeding in
New York state court, and ultimately attached Banco's property
there. 98 Banco removed the action to federal court and sought
immunity, but the court responded by rejecting the defense and
holding Banco accountable for waiving their immunity. 99 In more
recent litigation, a 2009 opinion struck another blow against sovereign's rights to immunity by refusing to recognize an ambiguity
defense where the waiver omitted the explicit jurisdiction. 100
In addition to these waiver decisions, the courts have
expressly failed to grant immunity through the doctrine of comity. In
U.S. courts, comity is defined as giving effect to the actions of a
foreign state, so long as those actions are in conformity with the laws
of the U.S. 10 1 For example, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago10 2 concerned a dispute where Allied's agent,
Fidelty Union, refused to agree to a restructuring that was already
accepted by other creditors. 10 3 In rejecting Allied's comity defense,
the court held that Costa Rica's unilateral behavior designed to
10 4
repudiate private obligations was inconsistent with U.S. policy.
Thus, this decision, like Weltover and Libra Bank, effectively served to
strip Costa Rica from their immunity in court proceedings.
Due to these decidedly pro-creditor opinions, VFs and other
similar creditors have responded by increasingly bringing their
570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Id. at 875-77.
98 d. at 885.
96
97

99

Id. at 897.
100
See Capital Ventures Int'l v. Republic of Argentina, 552 F.3d 289 (2d. Cir. 2009)

(holding that a waiver to immunity was not ambiguous even though the language
never explicitly stated that Argentina was waiving immunity in the U.S.).
'o' Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds:
Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 253, 254 (2003).
112 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), qff'd, 733
F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (per
curiam), rev 'd on reh 'g, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
103

Id.

104See

id
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claims in U.S. federal courts. Undoubtedly, VFs will continue to do so
as long as national legislation does not prevent them. Thus, VF
legislation purporting to cap recoveries is particularly important
now, considering the judicial trend to grant enormous judgments in
favor of VFs.10 5 Furthermore, the quicker VF legislation is enacted in
the U.S., the sooner these courts are prevented from interfering with
restructuring procedures in these cases.
It is noteworthy that at least one "Working Group" for the
ABA has expressed minor discontent with the Weltover standard; the
group indicates that they would recommend a heightened standard
by requiring a "substantial" and direct effect in the context of the
"commercial activity" exception.10 6 Such a standard would promote
VF legislation since it would reduce the likelihood that sovereign
could be hauled into court for merely issuing bonds in the secondary
debt market. Nevertheless, this proposal may not have any practical
effect, considering recent empirical data that estimates that poorer
sovereigns hold hundreds of billions of dollars in outstanding loans
in the markets of New York and London.10 7 This type of economic
activity strongly suggests that many sovereigns would indeed satisfy
the heightened economic activity standard, although a legitimate
question still remains as to whether their behavior was "direct" as
defined under Weltover. Since VF legislation is largely unnecessary to
begin with, however, further case law purporting to erode sovereign
immunity under ambiguous standards such as Weltover is simply
undesirable.
D. New Legislation CorroboratesWith the Current U.S. Position on
InternationalDebt Management
In the recent VF litigation, court opinions have attempted to
support pro-creditor arguments by stating that these decisions are
aligned with current U.S. interests on international debt manage'o'See generally Broomfield, supra note 1, at 487-91.
See Bradley, supra note 87, at 58-59 ("Report on the U.S. Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act" by a Working Group of the International Litigation Committee of
the Section of International Law and Practice of the American Bar Association,
April 2001, available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/policy/civillitigation/
foreignsovereignimmunities.pdf).
107Gelperin, supra note 72, at 3.
106
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ment. These justifications are incorrect, however, as competing
literature suggests that the U.S. position is currently in favor of
reducing damage awards for VFs, rather than promoting litigation in
creditors' favor. In one prominent example, CIBC Bank and Trust Co.
(Caynian) Ltd v. Banco Central do Brasil,10 8 the district court held in
favor of a breach of contract claim instituted by a VF against a
sovereign. 10 9 This was astonishing, partly because the U.S. Government issued a "Statement of Interest" in that case, declaring that VFs
"may seek through litigation to benefit from voluntary debt reduction previously agreed to by the commercial banks . . .rather than
negotiate a restructuring with the debtor in the orderly manner that
the United States described in its Allied brief and has supported
consistently since 1982 ... ."110 As a result, while the Allied court
seemed to adopt the positions supported by the U.S. in that case, the
CIBC Bank court would appear to depart from the prevailing U.S.
position. These factors are particularly instructive because they
reflect the court's modern desire to pursue its own interpretation as
these cases arise.
It should be briefly noted that the Allied case concerned a
lawsuit initiated by a syndicate of commercial banks, whereas CIBC
Bank merely concerned the interest of a secondary market debt holder
(in other words, a VF).111 Observing the fact that Allied was heard in
1984 and CIBC Bank was heard well after the Brady Plan in 1995, the
U.S. Government's position in CIBC Bank was that "while in 1984
banks rescheduled debt with the expectation of eventual full
repayment, the widespread acceptance of the Brady Plan, which calls
for commercial debt service and debt reduction, has generally
changed this expectation." 112 Thus, the U.S. policy changed in order
to evolve with the international markets, yet the courts retained old
principles of contract law that are arguably ineffective at promoting
economic stability.
In light of this perspective, it was unremarkable when the
court held in favor of the VF, Elliot Associates, in the widely
'08 See 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
109See Power, supra note 2, at 2745-51.
Old.at 2752-53 (citations omitted).
111

See id at 2737.
Id. at 2752 (citations omitted).
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recognized case Elliot Associates, L.P. v. Banco De La Nacion.113 It was
interesting, however, when the court took notice of two competing
U.S. interests in the underlying litigation: first, that the U.S.
encourages participation in the success of IMF resolutions, and
second, that the U.S. has a strong interest in enforcing valid debts
under the principles of contract law. 11 4 In the context of VF litigation,
however, it seems confusing to say that the U.S. has any interests
other than the position espoused in the "Statement of Interest" in
CIBC Bank, where the U.S. effectively supported IMF management
policies. Furthermore, national legislation, albeit nonbinding, bolsters
this argument by purporting to guide U.S. policy in light of
international debt management. 115 Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that the U.S. interest in contract law principles was actually assumed
in the enactment of legislation regarding international debt
management. The Elliot court and other decisions asserting pro-VF
positions suggest the court's desire to go out of their way to justify
holding sovereigns accountable for their defaulted payment, even in
light of clear statements suggesting an alternative U.S. position.
E. Reduced JudicialIntervention with Market Activity
Due to judicial opinions asserting a pro-creditor stance, the
effects of these decisions may be undesirable on the international
markets, where judges and juries lack the financial expertise to make
effective decisions. In one sense, this goes as far back as the "bridge
loans" issued in the aftermath of the debt crisis, where the courts
passively allowed banks to engage in the same exact unethical
behavior that prompted the debt crisis to begin with. Some commentators have recently asserted that these "rescue loans" increased
"moral hazard" because investors were allowed to engage in

113194 F.3d 363 (2d. Cir. 1999).
Bradley, suipra note 87, at 37.

114

...
See 22 U.S.C. § 5322(1) & (8) (1988) (Congressional "finding" asserting that the
international debt problem threatens the safety and soundness of the international
financial system, threatens the stability of international trading, and that new debt
approaches should focus on a reduction in current debt service obligations by debtor
nations).
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speculative activity despite knowing their high-risks.11 6 As a result, a
judicial trend was established which essentially acquiesced and
allowed this type of behavior to continue. Indirectly, therefore, the
courts left an impression on financial markets, and perhaps created
situations that led to unintended consequences affecting many
nations through international markets. The lack of penal oversight
also led to strict austerity measures that ultimately forced Latin
nations such as Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, and Brazil into deep
117
recession and eroded their ability to meet future debt obligations.
In contrast, the IMF policies on pre-debt crisis reflected the
notion that underdeveloped economies were weak and unstable, and
that they required enhanced regulatory oversight. This system saw
relative success up until the 1970s, when inflation prevented its
further development. Accordingly, one should question whether the
courts are even the correct forum for these disputes - after all, these
opinions provide little insight into their intended effect on international markets. In contrast with the IMF's policies of looking to
global management over international debt, U.S. judicial opinions
emerge narrow and shortsighted.1 1 8 Assuming that U.S. courts are
indeed the proper forum for these cases, there is considerable
evidence suggesting that strict limitations should be enforced in
order to protect international markets from further crisis.
V. CONCLUSION

In light of the historical developments leading to a sovereign
debt crisis and the evolution of a secondary debt market, U.S. judicial
opinions have failed to ensure broad safeguards for international
financial markets. As such, VFs have seen their day in court, and will
continue to enjoy profitable success at the expense of developing
economies, and perhaps world trade markets, unless government
caps are enforced on their recoveries. With other $300 billion in
bonds held in New York and London markets, it is especially
imperative that U.S. lawmakers encourage judicial limitations to
116

The Financial Crisis of Latin America and the New International Financial

Architecture, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twr I 22f.htm.
117See Riding, supra note 24.
118 The U.S. Congress' debates on the Vulture Act are heading on the right direction,
however.
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prevent further delay in developing country restructurings. A policy
emphasizing VF reform is in direct accord with U.S. foreign and
public policy, thus reflecting the appropriate position as an economic
world leader.

